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News media repertoires and strategic narrative reception: 
A paradox of dis/belief in authoritarian Russia 
Dr Joanna Szostek 
Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow, Royal Holloway, University of London 
 
ABSTRACT: With internet access, citizens in non-democracies are often able to 
diversify their news media repertoires despite government-imposed restrictions 
on media freedom. The extent to which they do so depends on motivations and 
habits of news consumption. This article presents a qualitative study of the 
motivations and habits underlying news media repertoires among a group of 
digitally connected university students in authoritarian Russia. Interviews reveal 
awareness and dissatisfaction vis-a-vis the 'propagandistic' nature of state-
controlled news content, resulting in a preference for using multiple different 
sources - including foreign websites and 'non-official' citizen accounts - to build a 
personal understanding of what is 'really' going on. The article then examines 
how the students make sense of conflicting narratives about international affairs 
which they encounter in state and non-state sources. Paradoxically, low reported 
consumption of distrusted, 'propagandistic' state television is often accompanied 
by reproduction of the overarching strategic narrative which state television 
conveys. 
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In non-democratic political systems there tend to be restrictions on the information and 
opinions that can be communicated via mass media. Indeed, a lack of media pluralism has 
traditionally been among the criteria by which non-democracies are identified as such. Dahl 
(1982: 11) declared that citizens in a democracy must have the right to ‘seek out alternative 
sources of information’ and alternative sources of information must ‘exist and be protected 
by law’. Countries where alternative, autonomous sources of information are supressed or 
absent find themselves, by extension, categorised as ‘hybrid’, ‘semi-consolidated’ or 
‘consolidated’ authoritarian regimes (Freedom House, 2015b). 
The spread of internet access, however, has radically extended the range of news source 
options available to the public even in many non-democratic states. Within their own 
borders, illiberal governments continue to harass journalists and orchestrate the content of 
state-run news outlets (Reporters Without Borders, 2015). Yet internet access makes it 
easier for alternative perspectives to circulate and allows individuals to step beyond the 
confines of their domestic media landscape into a borderless ocean of information where 
restrictions and censorship are harder to impose. Although there are mechanisms to filter or 
block ‘undesirable’ content in some places (Freedom House, 2015a), technical limitations 
mean that most governments cannot prevent internet connectivity from offering at least 
the possibility of news source diversity. Whether, how and why (not) citizens with internet 
in non-democracies are exploiting and responding to this possibility matters greatly for 
politics and international relations, given that different patterns of news exposure may lead 
to different impressions of what is happening in the world (Stroud, 2008), with 
repercussions for political behaviour. 
This article presents a study of news consumption among students at a prestigious and 
relatively liberal university in Russia to explore (a) how digitally connected individuals in an 
authoritarian media environment form and rationalise their news media repertoires, and (b) 
how such individuals respond to conflicting narratives they encounter in the media, 
particularly regarding their country’s role in international affairs. The study thus contributes 
to the literature on news media repertoires (Edgerly, 2015; Hasebrink and Domeyer, 2012; 
Hasebrink and Popp, 2006) by extending its geographical scope beyond Western 
democracies, and also to the literature on strategic narratives (Miskimmon et al., 2013; 
Roselle et al., 2014) by shedding light on the interplay between news media repertoires and 
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narrative reception. The empirical basis of the paper is a set of semi-structured interviews, 
in which 20 students from a university in Moscow were invited to describe and explain their 
approach to acquiring and interpreting news about international developments. The 
interviews were conducted in autumn 2014, a year when the mainstream Russian media, 
following Crimea’s annexation, were conveying a highly emotive narrative of world events, 
sharply at odds with the narratives that dominated the mainstream Western media.¹ 
Although the sample of respondents is not representative of the Russian population as a 
whole, the studied group has substantive theoretical interest.  The participants received 
Western narratives about events as well as the Kremlin’s narrative. Their responses to the 
conflicting narratives thus provide an important insight into how ‘powerful’ the Kremlin’s 
narrative is under conditions of news source pluralism and information abundance 
(conditions which Western policymakers are currently trying to encourage by funding 
‘alternative’ media for Russian-speaking audiences).  
A key finding to emerge from the study is that news on state TV channels – the most high-
profile disseminators of Russia’s strategic narrative – was overwhelmingly consumed 
‘inadvertently’ by the research participants, i.e. consumption was less a matter of deliberate 
individual choice and more a consequence of the home environment. State channels were 
considered propagandistic and featured in the students’ news media repertoires primarily 
due to the habits of older family members. The students were far more active in selecting 
online sources: many of them described attempting to construct a personal understanding 
of events by reviewing a diverse range of perspectives – often including major international 
news websites and blogs or forum posts written by informed ‘ordinary’ people. Trusting in 
the objectivity of any single source was commonly considered unadvisable. A further striking 
finding of the study, however, was that consensus about the need for scepticism and variety 
in news consumption was accompanied by very little divergence from the Russian state’s 
strategic narrative when the students explained Russia’s strained relations with the West. 
Most interviewees paradoxically expressed both distrust and/or distaste towards Russian 
state television and spontaneously reproduced the overarching narrative which Russian 
state television conveys regarding the causes and optimal solutions of East-West discord. 
For the literature on strategic narratives, these findings are significant as they underline that 
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an audience may ‘believe’ or accept a narrative even while ‘disbelieving’ or rejecting media 
sources via which the narrative is forcefully projected. 
The article begins with an overview of existing theory relating to the formation of news 
media repertoires, highlighting its potential to inform recent work within International 
Relations on the exercise of influence via strategic narratives. The design of the present 
study is then explained and the main findings presented, before a concluding section 
discusses their implications, limitations and avenues for future research. 
News media repertoires in the digital era 
Hasebrink and Domeyer (2012: 758) define a media repertoire as ‘the entirety of media’ a 
person uses regularly. However, their concept encapsulates more than the mere sum of 
various channels, publications, and other products. They describe a media repertoire as a 
‘meaningfully structured composition’ which holistically satisfies particular needs within the 
structures of the user’s social context; its components therefore cannot be properly 
understood in isolation. The conceptual framework of media repertoires places analytical 
emphasis on patterns of selection (the diversity or variability of selected content) rather 
than single variables (the likelihood of selecting a specific kind of content) (Hasebrink and 
Popp, 2006). This is advantageous in the contemporary media environment, where 
multiplicity and complexity are increasingly an everyday reality for consumers (Yuan, 2011). 
A repertoire-oriented approach to studying media consumption emerged in the 1980s, 
when TV viewers were observed attending to a relatively narrow ‘channel repertoire’ out of 
a much broader range of available channel options (Ferguson and Perse, 1993; Heeter, 
1985). The term ‘information repertoire’ was subsequently coined to refer to the set of 
sources which a person uses to find out about particular topics (Reagan, 1996). Recent work 
on media repertoires has emphasized how consumers integrate content from multiple 
platforms, brands and genres into their routine media diet (Swart et al., 2016; Taneja et al., 
2012; Yuan, 2011). A central concern has been to explain why certain combinations of 
media are used ahead of other possible combinations. The present study adopts the term 
‘news media repertoire’, since the focus here is on combinations of media outlets used to 
obtain news about current affairs. Moreover, this study approaches news media repertoires 
as being constituted by specific named sources (particular websites, particular TV 
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programmes and so on). Other researchers have sometimes taken a less finely-grained view, 
breaking repertoires down into general platform and genre categories such as ‘email’, ‘web 
search’ and ‘television viewing’ (Taneja et al., 2012; Yuan, 2011). 
The media repertoires literature builds on theories of media choice, including selective 
exposure and the uses and gratifications tradition (Blumler and Katz, 1974; Papacharissi, 
2008; Stroud, 2008). The latter are premised on an active audience making rational 
decisions about media consumption in the desire for information, affirmation, 
entertainment, social interaction or other rewards. Explanations of media repertoires have 
therefore tended to highlight individual motivations for accessing particular content via a 
particular set of platforms. Motivations may in turn be associated with individual 
demographic or psychological variables (education, age, need for cognition, etc.) that are 
known to affect media preferences (Das et al., 2003; Kraaykamp and Eijck, 2005; Poindexter 
and McCombs, 2001; Sears and Freedman, 1967). Swart, Peters and Broersma (2016) 
identify civic duty, compulsion, and monitoring events for security as motivations associated 
with different repertoires among Dutch media consumers. Schrøder (2015) and Schrøder 
and Larsen (2010) argue that ‘public connection’ (Couldry et al., 2007) and participatory 
affordances are central to different media’s ‘perceived worthwhileness’, which consumers 
assess in the process of forming their repertoires.  
A much discussed issue is whether, or to what degree, aversion to cognitive dissonance and 
a preference for cognitive consonance motivate the selection of homogeneous news media 
repertoires, contributing to a so-called ‘echo chamber’ or ‘filter bubble’ effect that is then 
amplified online by personalised content algorithms (Bennett and Iyengar, 2008; Festinger, 
1957; Pariser, 2011; Sunstein, 2001). Some evidence exists for this kind of selectivity, but 
the picture is not clear-cut. Best and colleagues (2005) found that critical views of the Bush 
administration positively predicted use of foreign online sources (carrying critical 
perspectives) during the Iraq war. A more recent study (Flaxman et al., 2016) established 
that Americans who predominantly visit ‘left-leaning’ news outlets only rarely read 
substantive news articles from conservative sites (vice versa for ‘right-leaning’ readers). 
However, that same study observed that most online news consumption in the USA is 
driven by individuals visiting the websites of ‘mainstream’ news organizations, which often 
profess to be non-partisan and carry a mix of views. Meanwhile Garrett (2009a; 2009b) 
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asserts that Americans are not sacrificing contact with other opinions even though they do 
use the internet to increase their exposure to ‘congenial’ content. 
Although most studies treat the audience as active agents in media selection, it is also 
recognised that routinized media repertoires can persist long after the motives which 
contributed to their initial compilation have lost relevance. The embeddedness of news 
consumption habits in everyday life makes them hard to break. Consequently, an individual 
may consider a news source ‘too negative’, ‘too boring’, ‘too expensive’, ‘too complicated’ 
or ‘unreliable’ – and yet still keep using it (Swart et al., 2016). Motivational factors are 
expected to operate in conjunction with situational, structural and environmental factors 
(Webster, 2009), which are sometimes found to outweigh the former as determinants of 
media use. Thus, Trilling and Schoenbach (2013) observe that region of residence is among 
the most powerful predictors of Austrians’ media repertoires – more powerful than 
personal attitudes and psychological traits. In a study of the Dutch audience, political 
interest – a motivational factor – was found to account for very little variation in individuals’ 
TV news viewing (Wonneberger et al., 2011). Watching preceding or subsequent 
programmes on the same channel and watching TV in company – situational factors – were 
much more significant. Time available for media consumption affects the breadth and 
content of a person’s media repertoire, as do ‘situational fit’, ease of access to different 
sources and awareness of alternatives (Wonneberger et al., 2009). Thus, structural 
constraints can moderate individual selectivity and intentional exposure. Some elements of 
a repertoire may even be determined by environmental factors alone, with no real 
selectivity at all – such as broadcasts playing in a regularly frequented public place or shared 
space that cannot be avoided. 
Normatively speaking, broad and diverse news media repertoires are usually treated as 
preferable to narrow and homogeneous ones on the basis that exposure to multiple 
perspectives makes for better informed citizens and hence more optimal decision-making. 
How, though, should breadth and diversity be gauged? Most existing studies are concerned 
with left-wing/right-wing, liberal/conservative or Democratic/Republican dichotomies, 
reflecting the literature’s Western-centricity. In non-democratic media environments, a 
much more salient dividing line tends to run between outlets that are controlled by (or 
aligned with) the state and those that are independent of state control (Leung and Lee, 
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2014). In countries such as Russia which face regular Western criticism for their 
authoritarian proclivities, this divide has an important geopolitical dimension: the state-
controlled media convey negative messages about critical Western states, while more 
positive or neutral portrayals of the West are found among the independent (including 
foreign-funded or foreign-based) alternatives. This makes media repertoires highly relevant 
to the study of strategic narratives. 
Strategic narratives and their reception 
The concept of strategic narrative is the foundation of an analytical framework for studying 
how influence operates through mass communication in international affairs (Miskimmon et 
al., 2013; Roselle et al., 2014). A narrative can be understood as the accentuation and 
emplotment of particular problems or turning points in a way that indicates both causation 
and a normatively desirable resolution. A narrative may span any number of stories and 
issues (Pomerantsev and Weiss, 2014), but it always emphasizes certain aspects of reality 
while omitting others (Subotić, 2015; Somers and Gibson, 1994), ‘fuses “is” and “ought”’ 
(Snyder, 2015), and thereby directs its audience towards the narrator’s vision of a better 
future. The political process is essentially one of constant, competitive narration: each side 
strategically projects its own value- and often emotion-laden account of the problems that 
matter most, what caused them and how they should be solved, with the aim of persuading 
others to the same view.1 For national governments, target audiences are located both at 
home and abroad. The substantial state funds spent on diplomacy, public diplomacy, 
international broadcasting and ‘soft power’ initiatives all testify to a consensus around Nye’s 
(2010: 8) assertion that foreign policy success depends on ‘whose story wins’. Narratives are 
scaffolding for human cognition (White, 1980; Patterson and Monroe, 1998), not only 
regarding the conscious appraisal of different arguments, but also the subconscious, longer-
term formation of interests and collective identities (Somers, 1994). Therefore, dual rewards 
are at stake in the projection of a strategic narrative: it can convince interlocutors into 
taking a particular course of action, while at the same time working to constitute and 
constrain how those interlocutors imagine themselves and the international system 
(Miskimmon et al., 2013). 
                                                          
1 In a sense, this idea of narration combines the ideas of agenda-setting and framing. 
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Key to the effectiveness and ‘power’ of a strategic narrative is its reception among elites and 
broader publics. Yet the process of strategic narrative reception is generally less accessible 
and hence less often studied than the processes and instruments involved in narrative 
formation and projection. Commentators all too often appear to assume a straightforward 
relationship between the amount of money spent on projecting a strategic narrative and the 
impact of that narrative on audiences. For example, headlines accuse Russia of ‘influencing 
European elections’ through its funding of propaganda, without presenting any solid 
evidence about consumption of the said propaganda or public reactions to it (Applebaum, 
2016). Think-tanks and analysts raise alarm about the West ‘losing the information war’ to 
Russia by citing the ‘hundreds of millions of dollars’ which the Kremlin is spending, then 
advise Western governments to spend more money on pushing alternative messages in 
response (Pomerantsev, 2015; Giles, 2016). Meanwhile, discussion of target audiences is 
negligible. The considerable heterogeneity and individual agency of news consumers 
regarding what they watch, read and believe are barely acknowledged, let alone 
investigated for their relevance to strategic narrative impact. 
Introducing the concept of media repertoire to the study of strategic narrative reception is 
helpful in several ways. First, it offers an approach to differentiating between audiences 
which corresponds to the reality of the contemporary media environment. Rather than 
breaking down audiences of strategic narratives along the usual geographic lines (‘the 
Russian audience’, ‘Western audiences’, ‘the audience in Donbas’), a media-repertoire 
approach recognises that non-geographic categories (e.g. online/offline) may be equally 
pertinent to issues of exposure and response. Similarly, a media-repertoire approach treats 
audiences of strategic narratives differentially with regard to the range of media they 
consume: reception is  likely to be a different kind of process among those who are highly 
dependent on a single source vs. those who use various numbers and types of other sources 
on a regular basis (Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur, 1976). 
The theory associated with media repertoires also provides a guide to questions which merit 
investigation vis-à-vis strategic narrative reception among mass audiences. If structural and 
motivational factors together account for an individual’s media repertoire, which of these 
factors explain exposure to particular strategic narratives? If variation between repertoires 
is explained partly by different motivations, what motivates a media user to include in or 
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exclude from his repertoire sources associated with different strategic narratives? Do the 
narratives themselves influence which source(s) get selected, in line with the selective 
exposure hypothesis? Moving from exposure to response, to what extent does variation in 
media repertoire correspond to variation in the acceptance/rejection of a strategic 
narrative? The following, empirical part of this article addresses these questions to the 
extent that the chosen case study allows. 
Methods and data 
Media repertoires can be and have been understood as patterns of behaviour, to be 
operationalised, measured and explained in statistical models. Yet media repertoires are 
also meaningful social practices which ‘make sense to the user’ and can be explained from 
the user’s own perspective (Hasebrink and Domeyer, 2012). The present study adopts the 
latter, user-centric, approach and aims to reveal the ‘logic’ behind media repertoires in 
participants’ own terms.  The study is small-n and exploratory in nature; it is not a firm base 
for generalizations about the Russian population as a whole. However, it does generate 
original insights into the news-navigation and sense-making experiences of one particular 
audience group, whose media environment is both authoritarian (domestically) and almost 
infinitely multifarious (online). 
Interviews were conducted in September and October 2014 among second-year students at 
Moscow’s Higher School of Economics (HSE). HSE is one of Russia’s most prestigious 
universities, specializing in economics, social sciences, mathematics and computer science. 
It is considered more liberal than other Russian universities and has partnerships with 
institutions in the West. It was chosen as a site for the study because its students all enjoy 
diversity of choice in where to obtain news, as internet access and reasonable proficiency in 
English are more or less universal. Importantly, HSE was also willing to grant access for the 
study to be conducted (other institutions were approached, but refused). The participants in 
this study should not be considered ‘average’ Russians – they come from the more 
privileged, urban and educated end of society, more likely to have travelled and to have had 
other kinds of contact with foreigners. Yet these characteristics make the students a group 
of heightened substantive interest. Not only do they have greater than average chances of 
occupying positions of influence in future (Mickiewicz, 2014), they are also ideal as a case 
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study for looking at audience reaction to narrative ‘clash’. The socio-demographic profile of 
HSE students suggests that they should have greater awareness of and ability to use foreign 
media than the vast majority of their compatriots, and thus a greater likelihood of 
encountering narratives about international affairs which contradict the dominant domestic 
(Kremlin-endorsed) narrative. The question of which narrative ‘prevails’ in such 
circumstances is important. 
The students’ news media use and support for the Russian state’s narrative about the West 
were initially investigated via a self-administered survey (n = 452), the results of which are 
reported elsewhere (insert citation post-review).² After completing the survey 
questionnaire, the students were asked if they would be willing to discuss their media use 
and views of international politics with the researcher – either individually or together with 
a course-mate of their choosing. Most of the interviews were conducted in Russian, 
although three were in English at the students’ request (they were keen to practice their 
language skills). In total 20 students were interviewed, although one interview has been 
discarded from the analysis due to poor recording quality. The interviews lasted around 30 
to 40 minutes and each student was asked the same set of open-ended questions: 
 How do you assess the current state of relations between Russia and the West? 
 How did relations between Russia and the West reach this state? 
 Which actions should be taken, by which side(s), to improve relations between 
Russia and the West? 
 How do you follow news about international relations and how do you assess the 
quality of coverage in the media you use? 
 How do you decide where to get news from and what to believe? 
The first three questions were intended to prompt the students into vocalising their own 
narratives of Russia’s strained relations with the West. The two latter questions were 
intended to elicit the students’ news media repertoires and influences within their social 
context which regulate exposure to particular sources. The transcripts and notes from the 
interviews were coded manually by the researcher using Atlas.ti. Coding focused first on 
emerging themes and patterns in the students’ accounts of how they encountered news, 
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and then on the causally interlinked problems and favoured resolutions that constituted the 
students’ own narratives of Russia’s strained relations with the West. 
The causally interlinked problems and favoured resolutions emplotted in the students’ 
narratives were then compared against the corresponding elements of the Russian 
government’s strategic narrative about tensions with the West. This government narrative 
was identified through methodical qualitative analysis of the leading weekly news 
programme on Russian state television (Vesti Nedeli), as well as statements by President 
Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, in the months preceding the study (June 
and July 2014). Further details of this analysis and the narrative itself are reported 
elsewhere (insert citation post-review). Figure 1 below summarises the state’s strategic 
narrative in terms of its basic structure. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
As Figure 1 illustrates, the Russian state’s narrative of tensions with the West follows a plot 
of causality that is rooted in the characterization of the USA as craving global dominance, 
driven by a sense of (unjustified) American exceptionalism. The USA’s sense of 
exceptionalism leads to hypocrisy on Washington’s part – ‘double standards’, whereby it 
criticises other countries for transgressing rules and norms while ignoring the same rules 
and norms itself. It also leads to American foreign policy being formulated and implemented 
unilaterally – without consultation or regard for the views and interests of others – and to 
strong opposition whenever a challenger to American dominance (such as Russia) emerges.  
European states are characterized as lacking the strength necessary to resist the USA in 
policy matters (even when it would be in their interests to do so); hence any Western 
consensus reflects American power rather than a truly shared stance. All the above results 
in excessive intervention by the West in the affairs of other states – intervention that 
violates norms and rules, puts American interests above the common good, and causes 
great damage (instability) because it is not informed by the wisdom of the non-Western 
world. This plot points to Russia’s desired ends in international politics: a reduction in 
US/Western foreign interventionism (particularly in parts of the world where Russian 
interests are at stake, such as Ukraine), a greater voice/veto for Russia and other 
(likeminded) non-Western countries in international decision-making, and weaker alignment 
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between Europe and the USA – which would make space for more ‘pragmatic’, profitable 
economic cooperation between Europe and Russia. 
To assess alignment between the Russian state’s strategic narrative and the students’ own 
spontaneous narratives of East-West tensions, each interview transcript was analysed for 
the presence/absence of each boxed element from Figure 1. The findings are reported 
below, after findings about the habits and motivations which shaped the students’ news 
media repertoires. 
Explaining news media repertoires and strategic narrative exposure 
State TV channels (most notably Pervyy Kanal, Rossiya 1, Rossiya 24 and NTV) are the 
Russian leadership’s principal domestic narrative-projection tools; their editorial policy is 
closely overseen by Kremlin officials (Loshak, 2015; Sidorov, 2015). One of the most striking 
findings to emerge from the interviews was that hardly any of the students reported 
watching these channels as part of a deliberate, active search for information. Rather, those 
who mentioned television as a news source described their viewing as something almost 
inadvertent – a product of their habits and family environment. One student (P6), for 
example said: 
‘Our television can be switched off straight away – it’s complete hot air [eto voobshche 
ne o chem]. But nevertheless, a Russian family comes [home] and switches on the 
television, right? … Although our generation less so. It also watches, but it’s very hard 
to believe all that stuff.’ 
Parental habits are influential. In Moscow it is common for several generations to live 
together in relatively small apartments where living rooms double up as bedrooms. 
Therefore, if the parents or grandparents are regular TV viewers, their young adult offspring 
are unlikely to live completely TV-free lives. One student (P8) made clear that her TV 
viewing – and news consumption more generally – depended heavily on her parents:  
‘If I’m honest, I don’t particularly follow the situation in the world, I’m more interested 
in my own life, so I can’t say that I make any kind of special selection [of news 
sources]. But sometimes my parents turn on the TV in the evening – I listen to what’s 
happened. And that’s all.’ 
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None of the interviewees indicated that they took TV news reports at face value. Levels of 
reported scepticism were high – and were sometimes contrasted against the apparent 
credulity of older generations. Thus, one student (P2) said: ‘I very, very rarely watch TV. My 
parents are constantly watching the first channel [Pervyy Kanal] and the second [Rossiya 1], 
but I am sceptical towards it.’ Another said that federal television was ‘complete bullshit 
[fuflo]’ (P6) but that his parents and grandparents’ generation ‘believed in it a bit’. The same 
interviewee (P6) admitted that he himself watched TV sometimes – ‘I can’t say that I don’t 
watch it – I do watch it’. But he emphasized his attempts to ‘filter’ what he saw and to ‘think 
what might be true in all that’. 
The interviewees did highlight qualitative differences between TV channels and 
programmes. One of the only students who watched state TV deliberately (P1) liked the 
discussion show hosted by Vladimir Pozner on Pervyy Kanal. Pozner is a high-profile 
presenter who grew up in the USA before returning to work on Soviet television. 
‘Mum and I sit and watch it [Pozner’s show] every Monday. It’s like a breath of fresh 
air. Because everything else on Russian TV doesn’t allow any opportunity to think.’ 
Non-state channels such as Euronews (the Russian-language version of the pan-European 
news channel) and Dozhd (a privately funded news channel) were also mentioned by a 
number of interviewees as ‘serious’ (P3) or ‘authoritative’ (P12, P14). These channels were 
considered somewhat less tendentious in their reporting than the state channels, although 
one user observed that Dozhd also had ‘a certain orientation [napravlennost]’ (P14) and 
Euronews was criticized for paying insufficient attention to Ukraine (P12). A couple of 
students recalled using foreign TV channels from time to time, but their very different take 
on events evoked confusion. ‘On my television, CNN and Russia Today are back to back. 
When I turn them on, I watch and I get the sense that I’m watching TV from different 
planets,’ one student said (P9). Another student who occasionally watched American shows 
said it was ‘completely obvious’ they were tendentious (zaangazhirovano) and ‘propaganda 
for the most part’ (P10).  
The internet was the students’ primary platform for accessing news. Their explanations for 
preferring the internet varied. Some found it to be less afflicted by the ‘hysterics, 
propaganda… subjectivism and ideology’ (P5) they saw on television. ‘When every channel is 
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saying the same thing, as a person who is educated and well brought up in a certain sense, it 
just becomes unpleasant and you turn to the internet,’ one said (P14). For others it was 
more a matter of convenience. One noted: ‘I simply don’t like watching TV. So it’s easier for 
me, when I’m travelling by metro, it’s easier for me to read news on the internet’ (P9). 
The students described varying approaches to navigating a path through the multitude of 
sources available online. A substantial proportion of those interviewed named one or 
several established news outlets which they liked or trusted enough to use on a regular 
basis. The sites of business-oriented dailies Vedomosti (P1) and Kommersant (P2, P3) were 
mentioned in this regard, as were RBC.ru (P1, P2, P3), Slon.ru (P1), the-village.ru (P3, P4), 
NovayaGazeta.ru (P3, P15), Meduza.io (P13, P14), Snob.ru (P12) and RIA.ru (P9, P15).2 
Loyalty to a particular news organization was not expressed by all the interviewees, 
however. Some spoke of relying on search engines and aggregator sites such as Yandex (P2) 
and Yahoo (P6), or their social media news feeds (P3, P4, P10, P18) and Twitter (P3, P14), to 
provide them with headlines and articles from a wide range of sources. Visiting sources 
beyond the boundaries of professional journalism – such as blogs (P8, P9, P20) or forums 
(P9, P17, P18, P19) – also constituted an important element of the news repertoire for 
some. 
A normative preference for constructing one’s own understanding of events based on a 
range of sources, especially non-official ‘citizen’ reports, came through strongly in almost all 
the interviews. Upon seeing dubious or contentious news on TV, one student (P8) said she 
used the internet to ‘confirm or refute’ the claims made: 
‘For example, when the Boeing [MH17] crashed [in Eastern Ukraine], many people 
said it was shot down by Russian forces. Many people said it was the Ukrainians… And 
then I read various blogs on the internet, analysed the opinions that were put forward 
by the Ukrainian side and our side, and it seems to me the Ukrainian side is more likely 
to be the guilty party, after all.’ 
Another student (P14) praised Twitter, in particular, for offering easy access to diverse 
viewpoints: 
                                                          
2 Of these, only RIA is state-owned; the rest are privately or commercially funded. 
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‘I think Twitter is good because I have subscribed to a certain group of people who 
represent different opinions... It’s like I can understand their position, then compare 
their position, roughly speaking, with the next tweet which another person has 
posted.’ 
Individuals providing ‘first-hand’ accounts from the scene of news events were considered 
especially valuable information sources. One student (P9), for example, said: 
‘The main resource, after all, is private commenting and communication on the 
internet and forums – first-hand information. I think it’s more correct [gramotno] to 
get a video from the scene of events, for example.’ 
Another student said he was provided with news about Ukraine by a friend in Donbas who 
was at the ‘heart of events’ (P19), while two others highlighted forums or blogs where they 
could learn about Ukrainian developments from individuals who apparently had direct 
connections to what was happening on the ground. A blog (Colonelcassad.livejournal.com) 
‘led by a communist from Sevastopol, not linked to the Party’ (P18) was one such source; 
another was described as ‘a forum where there were representatives from approximately 
60 countries, mostly Russian-speakers’, who had moved abroad but still had relatives in 
Ukraine. The student (P17) who used this forum said its participants had shared their 
impressions 
‘of what happened after their relatives [in Ukraine] went to rallies… impressions with 
confirmatory information, quite well-founded, quite confirmed, about some kind of 
psychotropic element being in the tea and food which they gave out.’ 
This comment about ‘psychotropic elements’ has the ring of a conspiracy theory; 
unverifiable rumours spread easily via online forums. Nevertheless, such non-official sources 
were highlighted by one student (P16) as more reliable than official ones with regard to 
analysis and interpretation of events – because ‘official’ media are more inclined to serve 
state interests, whichever side they are on. The student said he was unlikely to read analysis 
from ‘official’ media, whether Russian or Western: 
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‘They can’t intersect, so I prefer opinions, I read bloggers, the ones I think more or less 
have a grasp of the political situation, the foreign affairs situation, and I try to 
superimpose some kind of view of my own on what I know of the official facts.’ 
Interestingly, roughly half of the interviewed students included English-language or other 
non-Russian news websites among their repertoires, at least from time to time. These 
included the Guardian (P5), Vice News (P10), the Washington Post and the Economist (P13), 
Foreign Policy and the BBC (P14), the New York Times and the Daily Mail (P18) and even 
‘Ukrainian media… for the sake of interest’ (P16). Using foreign media tended to reflect the 
students’ belief that an accurate picture of developments could only be constructed 
autonomously by reviewing diverse viewpoints with a sceptical eye. As one interviewee (P6) 
put it, 
‘I make my own news. I look here and I look there and there… Add it up and divide by 
two. That’s how it is done.’ 
Another described his approach as the ‘comparison’ (sopostavleniye) of ideologically 
opposite sources – such as US-funded Radio Svoboda vs. Russian state television. However, 
he was not confident in the conclusions he could draw from such comparisons, noting that 
‘one has to listen for quite a long time to understand where the information is correct or 
not; not just a month or two must pass, but a whole year even… it’s rather difficult’ (P15). 
Moreover, interest in foreign media reporting was not universal. One student said she tried 
to ‘brush aside’ (otmetat) English language news with which she disagreed because she had 
her own ‘subjective opinion’ and ‘of course tried to avoid negative things’ which she 
considered incorrect (P9). 
Overall, a repertoire-based analytical approach is clearly appropriate for this audience. The 
majority of the students explained their news source selection with reference to other news 
sources; thus the composition of their news media repertories is best explained holistically. 
In line with existing theory, structural and motivational factors can be observed behind the 
formation of their repertoires. Distaste for a ‘hysterical’, ‘propagandistic’ style of news 
presentation motivated the students to selectively avoid certain outlets, although avoidance 
was mitigated by the influence of older family members. However, most of the students 
were not motivated to selectively avoid dissonant narratives. On the contrary, they actively 
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sought out contradictory perspectives in their attempt to construct their own 
understandings of events – which are discussed in the following section. 
Narrative responses 
Given their heterogeneous news media repertoires and scepticism about state television, 
one might have expected divergence between these students’ views of international affairs 
and the narrative promoted by the Russian government. In fact, however, there was 
considerable alignment. 
Table 1 illustrates how many of the students emplotted core elements from the state’s 
strategic narrative (identified in Figure 1) into their own spontaneous narratives when asked 
to explain Russia-West tensions and how relations might be improved. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
The students’ narratives were far less coherent and comprehensive than the strategically 
formulated state narrative; they intertwined certain elements from the state’s narrative 
with other ideas (some compatible, some contradictory) plus doubts and hesitations. 
Nevertheless, the state’s narrative echoed with varying degrees of strength and clarity in all 
but five (P5, P7, P14, P15, P17) of the interviewees’ contributions. 
Thus, tensions between Russia and the West were attributed to American or Western 
‘aggression’ (P12, P16) and relatedly to NATO’s eastward expansion (P2, P3). There were 
frequent references to the ‘inevitable’ or ‘continuous’ (P6, P11, P15) dynamics of rivalry 
between Russia and the US-led West, with the latter viewed as unwilling to ‘share the 
world’ (P4) or ‘accept Russia’s independence’ (P18) and ‘resistant’ to Russia defending its 
interests (P10). The West was described as ‘forgetting that it doesn’t know everything’ (P1), 
‘imposing its values (P16), and interfering in the affairs of other countries with ‘catastrophic 
consequences’ (P1). As per the state’s strategic narrative, the students saw Europe as 
‘dictated to’ (P9) or ‘pressured by’ (P6) the USA, which ‘uses’ Europe in its ‘attempts to 
occupy the super-position, so that no one can argue with any of its decisions’ (P13). 
Roughly half the students proposed resolutions to the tensions which mapped onto desired 
resolutions from the state’s narrative. There were calls for the West or the USA to ‘be less 
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involved in matters which concern Russia’ (P2), to ‘try not to influence everything that 
happens in the world’ (P4), to set up ‘some kind of council’ for dialogue with the BRIC 
countries (P8), to ‘accept equal rules for all’ (P18), ‘to change their double standards’ (P9) 
and to continue economic cooperation that is divorced from politics (P2) because it is ‘very 
beneficial for Europe’ (P3). Even when the students’ resolutions did not map directly onto 
the state’s strategic resolutions, they tended to be compatible: generic proposals such as 
‘more meetings between leaders’ (P12), both sides ‘searching for compromises’ (P9, P13, 
P19) and ‘gathering around a table’ (P10, P14) were quite common. One student suggested 
that there would need to be an ‘outright winner’ for the tensions to disappear (P15). 
Only five students vocalised narratives which directly clashed with that of the state, echoing 
narratives found in the mainstream Western media. Participant P5 attributed tensions to 
the fact that ‘no other countries have infringed international law like Russia’ and thought 
Russia should ‘change its position’. For participant P7, tensions were due to ‘people in 
Ukraine wanting to go with Europe, not Russia’, which the Russian government ‘did not like’; 
her proposed resolution was for Russia to ‘stop screaming about the United States’ and 
‘allow Ukraine to choose for itself’. Participant P14 acknowledged that Russia was a ‘direct 
participant’ in the Ukraine conflict and felt that the government should ‘end that bloody 
war’ if it ‘didn’t have a plan’, while participant P17 proposed ‘returning Crimea’ to Ukraine. 
Finally, P16 also saw the solution in Russia ‘leaving Ukraine’ – but only because it ‘could not 
win’ as it was ‘too dependent on the West’. 
The study thus observed support for the Russian state’s strategic narrative about 
international affairs among an audience which described Russian state media as 
‘propagandistic’ (P10, P16, P18), ‘one-sided’ (P8, P19), ‘unprofessional’ (P13), ‘untrue’ (P6, 
P9), hard to believe or trust (P2) or otherwise ‘terrible’ (P12), with many (P2, P4, P9, P10, 
P12, P15, P18) claiming to rarely or never watch television. These findings constitute 
something of a challenge to the axiom that authoritarian governments direct public opinion 
thanks to the messages spread by their powerful and loyal TV channels; among this 
(admittedly small) audience, the Russian government appears to have secured support for 
its narrative despite the content of its channels, which participants avoided and dismissed as 
untrustworthy. 
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Discussion 
The findings presented above raise almost as many questions as they answer. First, given 
the limited scope of the study, one might ask whether the observed dynamics of news 
media repertoire formation and the paradox of ‘believing the message while disbelieving 
the messenger’ are widespread phenomena, or unique to the distinctive participant cohort 
of HSE students. Additional research with larger, more diverse participant samples would be 
required to explore this issue. 
Existing public opinion polls already hint that similar patterns of dis/belief might be present 
among the wider Russian population. In 2014 almost 70 per cent of Russian citizens 
acknowledged that their main TV channels were censored (Levada-Tsentr, 2014a). Yet polls 
show similarly large majorities backing state television’s interpretations of international 
events, such as Western criticism of Russian actions in Ukraine being due to a desire to 
‘pressurize Russia and weaken Russian influence in the world’ (Levada-Tsentr, 2014b). 
Around half of the Russian population still gets its news exclusively from TV, but this figure is 
declining. Internet penetration in Russia is estimated to have risen from just 29 per cent in 
2009 to around 71 per cent at the end of 2014 (Freedom House, 2015a).  More than half of 
internet users are under the age of 35.  Far from every internet user accesses news online. 
In fact, Levada Centre data suggests that only 20–25 per cent of Russians do so, while 
television remains the ‘main’ news source for roughly 85 per cent of the Russian population 
– a figure that has changed little in the last seven years (Volkov 2016b). Nevertheless, the 
number of Russians with multiple sources in their news media repertoires is growing, 
especially in the most politically influential large cities. Volkov and Goncharov (2014) say a 
third of Moscow residents access online news regularly. So far they observe few differences 
in the political preferences of these online news consumers relative to offline Russians. Yet 
as with the HSE students, it seems inadequate to attribute the views of digitally connected 
Russians entirely to the direct, hypnotic effect of state television, when state television is 
not particularly trusted and alternative sources are being used. 
What, then, might explain the ‘power’ or resonance of Russia’s strategic narrative about 
international affairs among diverse domestic audiences, even those who distrust state 
media and turn to alternative sources? There is likely to be some indirect influence from 
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state television, which probably shapes ‘eyewitness’ discourse on the forums and blogs that 
certain individuals trust more than ‘official’ sources. The government also reportedly 
spreads its narrative in online discussions covertly through bots and paid ‘trolls’ (Rezunkov, 
2015), and there are many Russian news websites which are aligned with the state without 
being obviously controlled or owned by it. Sentiments of patriotism and national pride may 
give the state’s narrative greater appeal than competing alternatives, in which Russia is 
characterized negatively. Finally, part of the explanation may lie in long-term public 
discourse. Volkov (2016a) writes that as early as May 1998 around 75 per cent of Russians 
believed America was trying to weaken Russia, with 51 per cent saying that America was 
unceremoniously interfering in the affairs of other countries. He has observed (Volkov, 
2015): 
‘By the moment Putin arrived as president at the start of 2000, the USA’s image 
had already acquired its familiar characteristics without the help of the daily TV 
propaganda to which we now readily attribute its appearance.’ 
The Russian state’s current strategic narrative draws heavily on narratives or themes that 
have been circulating and resonating widely in Russian society for decades. The present 
alignment between the state’s strategic narrative and the views of so many Russian citizens, 
including the students who contributed to this study, may owe much to experiences, 
memories, imaginations and fantasies accumulated individually and collectively over the 
long term (Pilkington et al., 2002), not only through news media but also school, family, 
peer groups and popular culture. 
It may seem odd to urge further research on news media repertoires and strategic narrative 
reception, having just found that variety in the former does not guarantee much variation in 
the outcome of the latter. However, it would be worth collecting more detailed, accurate 
data on news media repertoires in a range of authoritarian contexts, as there may still be a 
relationship between repertoire breadth/content and narrative reception outcome which 
the present study could not uncover. The interview method used here was only able to 
capture one snapshot in time, and it is possible that participants may have ‘self-censored’ to 
some degree to give socially acceptable responses. A broader range of methods should 
therefore be employed to cover a more extended period – diaries and panel studies, for 
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example, could be productive. Finally, there is a strong case for arguing that variation in 
media repertoires affects the sense-making processes behind narrative reception, if not 
always outcomes. Sense-making among the digitally connected individuals studied here did 
not match the model of credulity and easy ‘brainwashing’ which is often ascribed to 
audiences in non-democracies. Further exploration of these sense-making processes among 
different audiences, with different media repertoires, would therefore be valuable, and 
could greatly contribute to understanding how influence works (or fails to work) through 
strategic narratives in international affairs. 
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Notes 
¹ Russia annexed Crimea in March 2014, after supporting a rushed and flawed referendum 
that did not allow Crimean voters to keep the status quo. The annexation followed the 
ousting from power of Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych. Russian leaders claim the 
mass protests which toppled Yanukovych were orchestrated by Western governments. 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its support for the separatist movement in Ukraine’s 
Donbas region were strongly condemned by the United States and the EU, which imposed 
sanctions as their relations with Moscow deteriorated to the worst state seen since the end 
of the Cold War. 
² The results of the survey were in line with the results from the individual interviews. More 
than half the students who participated in the survey reported using at least one 
‘alternative’ news source which regularly conveys narratives at odds with the Russian state’s 
narrative (specifically, the TV channel Dozhd, the radio station Ekho Moskvy, the websites 
slon.ru, snob.ru, grani.ru, and BBC Russian, and the newspapers Vedomosti and Novaya 
Gazeta). At the same time, most of the students expressed more agreement than 
disagreement with Russian state’s strategic narrative, as measured by a series of Likert 
items. Regression analysis of the survey results indicated that students who used no state-
aligned media were inclined to express less strong agreement with the Russian strategic 
narrative than users of state-aligned media – but overall they still agreed with it more than 
disagreed. Use vs. non-use of the ‘alternative’ sources had only a small statistical effect on 
support for the state’s strategic narrative. 
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Interviews 
P1 – Male student, Moscow, 16 October 2014 
P2 – Female student, Moscow, 17 October 2014 
P3 – Female student, Moscow, 17 October 2014 
P4 – Male student studying PR and Communication, Moscow, 17 October 2014 
P5 – Male student studying History, 17 October 2014 
P6 – Male student studying Advertising and Public Relations, 20 October 2014 
P7 – Female student studying History, 21 October 2014 
P8 – Female student studying Economics, 21 October 2014 
P9 – Female student studying Psychology, 21 October 2014 
P10 – Male student studying Philosophy, 22 October 2014 
P11 – Male student studying Economics, 22 October 2014 
P12 – Female student studying Business-Informatics, 23 October 2014 
P13 – Male student studying Business-Informatics, 23 October 2014 
P14 – Male student studying Law, 23 October 2014 
P15 – Male student studying Law, 24 October 2014 
P16 – Male student studying Law, 24 October 2014 
P17 – Male student studying Mathematics, 24 October 2014 
P18 – Male student, Moscow, 24 October 2014 
P19 – Male student studying Mathematics, 27 October 2014 
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Figure 1: Summary of Russian state's strategic narrative about international affairs 
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Table 1: Elements of Russian state's strategic narrative reproduced by students 
participant# 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
US exceptionalism                    
US dominance    ●        ● ●       
Europe not challenging US    ●  ●   ●  ●  ●       
US double standards         ●         ●  
US ignores others        ●            
US(-led) interference ●   ●  ●    ●      ●    
US undermines challengers    ●  ●    ● ●       ● ● 
Political instability, wars ● ● ●   ●   ●           
(Russia-West tensions) ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
Reduce interventionism  ● ● ●                
More voice for ‘non-West’ ●    ●   ● ●           
Weaker US-EU alignment                  ●  
Beneficial Russia-EU ties  ● ●          ●     ●  
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